In the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China, the American approach has been characterized by a strategic deficit, allowing Beijing to exploit vulnerabilities and gain leverage. This deficit has been a result of U.S. policymakers' reluctance to fully exploit or deepen China's weaknesses, often viewing such efforts as unnecessary or counterproductive. However, the situation demands a shift towards a more competitive strategy, leveraging China's vulnerabilities to protect and advance U.S. national interests. This strategy should be carefully timed and sequenced, focusing on multiple time frames and scenarios, and should aim to limit China's ability to threaten the U.S. and its partners, make aggression more costly, and ultimately improve the prospects for restraint and stability. The key to this strategy lies in identifying and targeting China's pain points, such as its dependence on foreign export markets, critical minerals, and the U.S. dollar, while also exposing its covert and coercive practices abroad. By doing so, the U.S. can compel Beijing to do more of what it is already doing, but at greater expense and with lesser effect, ideally forcing it to divert resources away from other, more threatening initiatives. Personally, I think that this approach is essential for maintaining a balance of power and ensuring that China's aggressive behavior is met with a credible and proportional response. What makes this particularly fascinating is the need to balance competitive leverage with the risk of escalation and retaliation. The U.S. must carefully develop and stress-test options now, not improvise under pressure, to ensure that any measures taken are effective and do not inadvertently harm U.S. interests. From my perspective, the success of this strategy will depend on the ability of U.S. policymakers to navigate the complexities of great-power competition, leveraging China's vulnerabilities while avoiding the pitfalls of overreach and escalation. One thing that immediately stands out is the importance of building coalitions with allies to support these efforts, as China's predatory practices often require a coordinated response. What many people don't realize is that the U.S. has the potential to turn China's malign activities into sustained reputational liabilities, which can be a powerful deterrent. If the U.S. can expose China's destabilizing international behavior, it can force Beijing to divert resources towards damage control, tarnish its carefully cultivated image, and erode the tenuous international standing on which its great-power ambitions depend. This raises a deeper question: how can the U.S. effectively leverage China's vulnerabilities while also addressing its own domestic challenges and rebuilding strength? In my opinion, the answer lies in a combination of competitive leverage and domestic renewal, where the U.S. can tilt the competition in its favor by targeting China's pain points while also investing in its own economy and military. A detail that I find especially interesting is the role of the U.S. dollar in this strategic competition. The dollar's dominance in China's international economic activity provides a significant and exploitable vulnerability, and the U.S. should prepare to impose unacceptable costs on Beijing during a crisis or conflict to deter Chinese aggression or escalation. What this really suggests is that the U.S. must develop competitive leverage to support a second objective: deterrence. This leverage need not be deployed right away, or even during a trade war, but developing the tools now would ensure that the U.S. is ready to impose unacceptable costs on Beijing during a more intense crisis or conflict. In conclusion, the U.S. must build and wield its own competitive leverage to address the strategic deficit and effectively compete with China. This requires a careful and nuanced approach, leveraging China's vulnerabilities while also addressing its own domestic challenges and rebuilding strength. By doing so, the U.S. can tilt the competition in its favor and improve the prospects for restraint and stability in the ongoing strategic competition with China.
